We show exact values for the worst-case price of anarchy in weighted and unweighted (atomic unsplittable) congestion games, provided that all cost functions are bounded-degree polynomials with nonnegative coefficients. The given values also hold for weighted and unweighted network congestion games.
Introduction

Motivation and Framework
Large-scale communication networks like, e.g., the Internet often lack a central regulation for several reasons: The size of the network may be too large, or the players may be free to act according to their private interests. Even cooperation among the players may be impossible due to the fact that players may not even know each other. Such an environment-where players neither obey some central control instance nor cooperate with each other-can be modeled as a non-cooperative game [28] .
Given certain rationality assumptions on players, game-theoretic equilibria provide predictions for the outcome of non-cooperative games. Arguably the best-known equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium, which is a "stable" outcome where no player can improve his cost by unilaterally changing his strategy. In a seminal paper, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [24] initiated the study of worst-case approximation guarantees for Nash equilibria, i.e., they suggested to systematically quantify the degradation of some global objective due to the players' selfinterested behavior and the lack of cooperation. Specifically, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou defined the price of anarchy (PoA) as the worst-case ratio between the objective function in a Nash equilibrium and its value in any other outcome.
Congestion games are a special class of non-cooperative games that provide a simple, yet powerful model of self-interested resource sharing: There is a measurable set of players and finitely many resources, and the strategies available to the players consist of subsets of the given resources. The archetype of congestion games is selfish routing [36] where strategies are paths in a network. Since players' strategies may overlap, congestion effects occur and strategic interaction arises. Specifically, using a resource comes at a cost that depends on the total mass of the players using this resource. Each player strives to choose a strategy that minimizes the sum of his used resources' costs.
In this work, we study the atomic unsplittable variant of congestion games, as introduced by Rosenthal [34] : There are finitely many players, who each have a non-negligible influence in the game (in terms of measure theory, each player is an atom in the set of players). Each player must choose a single strategy (i.e., he cannot perform load balancing over several strategies). We also study a generalization by Milchtaich [29] : He defined weighted congestion games in which the players have weights and thus different influences on the congestion on the resources.
In the context of selfish routing in road traffic systems, the non-atomic variant of congestion games was already studied in the 1950's (see, e.g., [41, 4] ). Here, there are infinitely many players who each have infinitesimal weight (in terms of measure theory, the set of players contains no atoms). In the computer science literature, non-atomic congestion games were the first variant of congestion games for which a complete characterization of the PoA was shown [39, 40] .
The PoA directly depends on the definition of the global objective-often called social cost: In their seminal paper, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [24] considered a very simple weighted (atomic unsplittable) congestion game with singleton strategy sets, now known as the KPmodel. For this model, they defined the social cost as the expected maximum resource cost. For non-atomic congestion games, in contrast, Roughgarden and Tardos [40] considered social cost defined as the total cost-which in the context of selfish routing is proportional to the average travel time.
For atomic unsplittable congestion games, Awerbuch et al. [2] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [7] also considered the total cost. In this setting, they showed asymptotic bounds on the worst-case PoA for weighted and unweighted games, provided that all resource cost functions are bounded-degree polynomials with nonnegative coefficients. For the case of affine cost functions they gave exact values for the worst-case PoA.
Contribution and Comparison
In this work we prove exact bounds on the worst-case PoA for unweighted and weighted (atomic unsplittable) congestion games 1 , provided that all cost functions are bounded-degree polynomials with nonnegative coefficients. We use the total cost as social-cost measure. This improves on results by Awerbuch et al. [2] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [7] , who gave non-matching upper and lower bounds. We now describe our findings in more detail.
• For weighted congestion games we show that the worst-case PoA is exactly
to higher degrees. We show that Φ d is irrational for all d ∈ N and asymptotically grows as Θ(
This result closes the gap between the previous best upper and lower bounds on the worst-case
• For unweighted congestion games we show that the worst-case PoA is exactly
where k = Φ d . The worst-case PoA is bounded from below by Φ d d+1 and from above by Φ d+1 d . Prior to this paper, the best known upper and lower bounds were of the form [7] . However, the term o(1) still hides a gap between the upper and the lower bound.
We show that our bounds hold whenever no player can improve his expected cost by making a unilateral deviation. Consequently, the worst-case prices of anarchy with respect to pure Nash, mixed Nash, correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria always coincide. 2 Moreover, we show that the above values also hold for the subclasses of unweighted and weighted network congestion games.
For our upper bounds, we use a similar technique as Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [7] , yet with a more elaborate analysis. The core of our analysis for unweighted games is to minimize λ 1−µ under the following constraint: For all polynomials with nonnegative coefficients and maximum degree d, and for all nonnegative integers x, y it must hold that
For the case of weighted players, a slight variant of (1.1) has to hold for all reals x, y ≥ 0.
In order to prove their upper bound for unweighted games, Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [7] looked at (1.1) with µ = 1 2 and gave an asymptotic estimate for λ. In our analysis, we optimize both parameters λ, µ. This optimization process requires new ideas and is non-trivial. is given, where N is the largest integer for which (N −1) d+2 ≤ N d holds. The column with the upper bound from [7] is computed by using (1.1) with µ = 1 2 and optimizing λ with the help of our analysis. Thus, the column shows the best possible bounds that can be shown with µ = 
Previous Work
The papers most closely related to our work are those of Awerbuch et al. [2] and Christodoulou and Koutsoupias [7, 8] . For unweighted congestion games and social cost defined as total cost, it was shown that the worst-case PoA with respect to pure Nash equilibria is 5 2 for affine resource cost functions and d Θ(d) for polynomial cost functions with maximum degree d and nonnegative coefficients [2, 7] . For weighted congestion games, the worst-case PoA is
for affine resource cost functions and d Θ(d) for polynomial cost functions with maximum degree d and nonnegative coefficients [2] .
The price of anarchy [32] was first introduced and studied by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [24] (the original paper used the term coordination ratio). As a starting point of their investigation, they considered a simple weighted congestion game with singleton strategy sets, now known as KP-model. In the KP-model, cost functions are linear and social cost is defined as the maximum expected resource cost. In this setting, there exist tight bounds on the worst-case PoA of Θ( log m log log m ) for identical resource cost functions [10, 25] and Θ( log m log log log m ) for linear cost functions [10] . The PoA has also been studied for variations of the KP-model, namely for non-linear resource cost functions [11, 19] , for the case of restricted strategy sets [3, 21] , for the case of incomplete information [20] , and for different social-cost measures [18, 27, 16] . In particular, Lücking et al. [27] studied the total cost (they called it quadratic social cost) for atomic unsplittable congestion games with singleton strategies and linear resource cost functions. For this model they showed that the worst-case PoA with respect to pure Nash equilibria is exactly 4 3 for the case of identical player weights, and 9 8 for the case of identical resource cost functions and arbitrary player weights.
Atomic unsplittable congestion games were first defined by Rosenthal [34] and extensively studied afterwards (see, e.g., [15, 29, 30] ). In Rosenthal's (unweighted) model, the strategy of each player is a subset of resources. Resource cost functions can be arbitrary but they only depend on the number of players sharing the same resource. Rosenthal showed that such games always admit a pure Nash equilibrium using a potential function. Monderer and Shapley [30] characterized games that possess a potential function as potential games and showed their relation to (atomic unsplittable) congestion games. Milchtaich [29] considered weighted congestion games with player-specific cost functions and showed that these games do not admit a pure Nash equilibrium in general. Fotakis et al. [15, 14] considered the PoA for symmetric weighted network congestion games in layered networks [15] and for symmetric (unweighted) network congestion games in general networks [14] . In both cases they defined social cost as expected maximum resource cost. For a survey on weighted congestion games we refer to [17] .
For non-atomic congestion games, tight bounds on the worst-case PoA predate most of the above works on atomic unsplittable games. They were proven by Roughgarden and Tardos [39, 40] already shortly after the PoA was introduced in [24] . With the total cost as socialcost measure, the worst-case PoA was shown to be 4 3 for affine resource cost functions [39] and
for polynomial cost functions with maximum degree d and nonnegative coefficients [40] . The asymptotic growth of the latter expression is Θ(
An overview on results for this model can be found in [35] . Subsequent to [39, 40] , Perakis [33] considered a generalization of non-atomic congestion games where costs are non-separable in terms of the resource loads. Similar to (but independent of) our work, she also used a twoparameter optimization to determine tight bounds on the price of anarchy.
Subsequent Work
After the conference version of this paper [1] , several subsequent works have shaped a more complete picture of the worst-case PoA in the various congestion-game variants:
• Blum et al. [6] were the first to show that for unweighted congestion games with affine resource cost functions, the worst-case PoA holds with no quantitative degradation also with respect to coarse-correlated equilibria.
• Roughgarden [37] distilled and generalized our two-parameter optimization into what he dubbed smoothness framework. This framework unifies essentially all previous upperbound proofs for atomic unsplittable congestion games. Roughgarden also generalized the above result by Blum et al. [6] : He proved for arbitrary classes of resource cost functions that the worst-case PoA in unweighted congestion games holds without quantitative degradation also with respect to coarse-correlated equilibria. On the lower-bound side, Roughgarden [37] showed that our unweighted lower-bound construction can be generalized to arbitrary cost functions as well.
• Gairing and Schoppmann [16] , and later Bhawalkar et al. [5] in more general form, showed that the worst-case PoA for both weighted and unweighted congestion games is already attained on parallel links. Bhawalkar et al. [5] moreover showed that Roughgarden's smoothness framework is equally applicable to weighted congestion games, and they gave a matching lower-bound construction for all sets of resource cost functions (under mild restrictions).
• Using our two-parameter approach, Harks [22] obtained the first tight upper bounds on the PoA for atomic splittable congestion games, where players can split their weight arbitrarily among their strategies. (Harks' result improved previous bounds by Cominetti et al. [9] .) Later, Roughgarden and Schoppmann [38] generalized the smoothness framework to "local smoothness" and showed that the two-parameter optimization yields exact values for the worst-case PoA in all games with convex strategy sets and convex cost functions. Using that, they established exact values for the worst-case PoA in atomic splittable congestion games with arbitrary cost functions.
Roadmap
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formally define the model. We establish exact bounds on the worst-case PoA for weighted congestion games in Section 3 and for unweighted congestion games in Section 4. All purely analytical tools that we believe to be of independent interest are given in Section 5.
The Model
For d ∈ N, we denote by P d the set of all polynomials with maximum degree d and nonnegative coefficients. That is, for all ∈ P d there are a 0 , . . . ,
Congestion Games In an (atomic unsplittable) congestion game, a finite ground set of resources E has to be shared among n ∈ N players: Specifically, each player i ∈ [n] commits to using one particular subset, out of a collection S i of non-empty subsets of E. The contribution of player i to the load ("congestion") on each resource he uses is determined by his weight w i ∈ R >0 . In the special case where all weights are 1, we say the congestion game is unweighted, otherwise we say the congestion game is weighted. Using a resource e ∈ E incurs a load-dependent cost e : R ≥0 → R ≥0 . In this work, we only consider games with cost functions from P d ; all these cost functions are non-decreasing.
Network congestion games are specified by a graph G = (V, E), together with origin-destination
. Each edge in the graph is a resource, and each player i's collection S i consists of all paths from o i to d i .
Strategy Profiles, Load, and Cost The collection S i is called strategy set of player i, and any particular choice x i ∈ S i is called a strategy. A strategy profile is a vector of strategies x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ S := S 1 × · · · × S n that captures a particular outcome of a game. Given a strategy profile x and a resource e, we denote by x i e the load player i places on resource e in strategy profile x, i.e., x i e := w i if e ∈ x i and x i e := 0 otherwise. For convenience, we define x e := i∈ [n] x i e as the total load on resource e. The cost of player i is defined as c i (x) := e∈E x i e · e (x e ) = w i · e∈x i e (x e ). We use a utilitarian measure for the cost for society, and define the social cost as the total cost,
Equilibria We are interested in the equilibria of congestion games, i.e., strategy profiles (or probability distributions over strategy profiles) that leave no player an incentive to unilaterally change his behavior. Formally, a pure Nash equilibrium [31] is a strategy profile x where for all players i ∈ [n] and all strategies y i ∈ S i the Nash conditions c i (x) ≤ c i (y i , x −i ) hold. More generally, we look at probability distributions P over S where the Nash conditions hold in expectation, i.e.,
While not the focus of this work, we remark that the set of probability distributions satisfying (2.1) is commonly divided into the following hierarchy (see [42] for an introduction and also [37] and its references). In a mixed Nash equilibrium P , all players' strategies are stochastically independent. Note here that we can consider a pure Nash equilibrium x as a mixed Nash equilibrium P that places all probability on x. A correlated equilibrium P satisfies for all players i ∈ [n] and all functions δ i :
As the most general notion in this hierarchy, a coarse-correlated equilibrium P is just characterized by (2.1). To summarize, we have the following set of inclusions for the sets of equilibria in a game: pure Nash ⊆ mixed Nash ⊆ correlated ⊆ coarse-correlated. While the set of pure Nash equilibria may be empty in weighted congestion games [26, 23] it is always non-empty in unweighted congestion games [34] . The sets of mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse-correlated equilibria are never empty [31] .
Price of Anarchy The price of anarchy (PoA) in a congestion game, with respect to any of the above equilibrium concepts, is the largest possible ratio between the social cost of an equilibrium and that of a minimum-cost strategy profile. Formally,
The interpretation of the worst-case PoA is here that it bounds the cost of pure Nash equilibria in instances where pure Nash equilibria exist. We remark that going to a more general equilibrium concept corresponds to dropping constraints and thus can only increase the PoA.
Weighted Congestion Games
In this section, we establish exact values for the worst-case PoA in weighted congestion games, provided that all cost functions are bounded-degree polynomials with nonnegative coefficients.
No quantitative differences exist with respect to pure Nash, mixed Nash, correlated, and coarsecorrelated equilibria. 4 
Upper Bound
To upper-bound the PoA, we give an upper bound on the social cost of all probability distributions over strategy profiles that satisfy the Nash conditions in expectation (2.1). The upper bound crucially relies on a purely analytical result that we state first. We defer its proof to Section 5.3.
In an arbitrary weighted congestion game with cost functions in P d , let P be a probability distribution over strategy profiles such that, for every player, the Nash conditions are satisfied in expectation (2.1). Moreover, let y be a minimum-cost strategy profile. Then
Proof. We first bound the expected cost of each player i ∈ [n] in the equilibrium P . By the Nash conditions, player i cannot improve by switching to the pure strategy y i . That is,
where the last inequality is due to the fact that the cost functions considered in this paper are non-decreasing. By exploiting the linearity of expectation twice, we can now bound the expected social cost by
Choosing (λ, µ) ∈ R × (0, 1) as the minimizer in Theorem 3.1 gives the bound
where the last equality is again due to the linearity of expectation. Rearranging yields the theorem.
Lower Bound
We proceed by providing a matching lower bound, which holds even for network congestion games. We first give a general construction of a (non-network) instance (Theorem 3.3) and then present a network congestion game that is based on this construction (Theorem 3.4).
There is a weighted congestion game that has a pure Nash equilibrium x and some other strategy profile y such that
We construct a weighted congestion game with n = (d + 1) · k players and |E| = n resources. The goal of our construction is to create a pure Nash equilibrium x in which each resource has Φ d times as much load as at the other strategy profile y.
We divide the set E into d + 1 disjoint subsets:
Like the resources, we also partition the set of players [n]:
To keep the notation human-parsable, we will only write i, j instead of u i,j in sub-and superscripts.) Each player u i,j ∈ N i has weight w i,j = Φ i d and a 2-element strategy set S i = {x i,j , y i,j }, where
Consider now the pure strategy profile x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ). Due to the symmetry of our definitions, each resource e ∈ E d is used by exactly It follows that all resources have Φ d times as much load at profile x as they have at the strategy profile y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ).
For x to be a pure Nash equilibrium, the following Nash conditions for each set N i of players need to be fulfilled:
Replacing "≤" by "=" yields a homogeneous system of linear equations, that is, the system B d · a = 0 where B d is the following (d + 1) × (d + 1) matrix:
and a := (a d . . . a 0 ) t . Obviously, a solution to this system fulfills the initial Nash conditions. Note that
We proceed by showing a property of B d .
Proof (of the claim). Consider the matrix C d that results from adding row j multiplied by the factor Φ −1
Obviously, C d is a lower triangular matrix with nonzero elements only in the first column and on the principal diagonal.
For the top left element of C d we get
Since all elements on the principal diagonal of C d -with the just shown exception of the first one-are nonzero, it is easy to see that C d (and thus also B d ) has rank d. 
Theorem 3.4. The previous Theorem 3.3 also holds for network congestion games.
Proof. Each instance of the congestion game in Theorem 3.3 can be characterized by two parameters: The degree d of the polynomial resource cost functions and the number of resources
Recall that both the total number of resources as well as the number of players are given by (d + 1) · k. Given such an instance we construct an equivalent network congestion game.
While following our construction description it will be helpful to keep half an eye on Figure 3 .1, which shows an example for d = 2 (quadratic resource cost functions) and k = 2. For each player u i,j , gray nodes denote origins, whereas nodes with a thick outline represent destinations. Note that for the sake of clarity not all edges are shown, as will be explained later. Edges without a label have e (x) = 0 as their cost function. We call these edges free edges. All other edges have the associated cost function as in Theorem 3.3. The network corresponding to an instance (d, k) can be constructed as follows: There is a circle of 2 · k edges where every other edge represents g d,1 , g d,2 , . . . , g d,k . All remaining edges in the circle are free edges. Furthermore, every player u i,j has its own origin node which has a single free edge to g d,j+1 . Consequently, circle edge g d,j+( d i ) connects to a free edge, which then in turn connects to edge g i−1,j . (In case i = 0, the latter is simply another free edge.) From there, another free edge to the destination node of player u i,j exists. Note that, thus far, the graph has exactly one acyclic path for each player, i.e., for each origin-destination pair. Each of these paths represents the respective player's "Nash" strategy which has been denoted as x i,j in Theorem 3.3.
We can now add two more free edges for each player u i,j that allow him to also use his "optimal" strategy y i,j : From u i,j 's origin node add a free link to g i,j (we call this an A-link ), and from g i,j add a free link to u i,j 's destination node (called a B-link ). Note that in Figure 3 .1, A-and B-links are only shown for player u 1,1 , while the figure is complete otherwise. The thick gray path denotes player u 1,1 's strategy in the system optimum, whereas the dotted path indicates his strategy in the worst-case Nash equilibrium.
Player u i,j 's A-link obviously cannot create shortcuts for other players because player u i,j 's origin node only has outgoing edges. Similarly, his destination node only has incoming edges and therefore his B-link cannot create shortcuts for other players, either. Finally, neither player u i,j 's A-nor B-link can create a shortcut for his strategy x i,j because the A-link, B-link, and x i,j do not share any nodes except for the origin and destination nodes.
Note, however, that B-links do create additional paths: In Figure 3 .1, for instance, player u 1,1 now has the further option of using a path consisting of five edges: three free ones, g 2,2 , and g 1,1 . Nevertheless, all such additional paths are supersets of the player's optimal strategy and thus neither change the system optimum nor the worst-case Nash equilibrium.
Unweighted Congestion Games
In this section, we establish exact values for the worst-case PoA of unweighted congestion games, provided that all cost functions are bounded-degree polynomials with nonnegative coefficients. No quantitative differences exist with respect to pure Nash, mixed Nash, correlated, and coarsecorrelated equilibria. 5 The structure of this section is very similar to the previous Section 3, yet there are some subtle differences in the proofs. In particular, the worst-case PoA turns out to be slightly smaller than for the weighted case.
Upper Bound
To upper-bound the PoA, we give an upper bound on the social cost of all probability distributions over strategy profiles that satisfy the Nash conditions in expectation (2.1). Again, the upper bound crucially relies on a purely analytical result that we state first. We defer its proof to Section 5.4. 
In an arbitrary unweighted congestion game with cost functions in P d , let P be a probability distribution over strategy profiles such that, for every player, the Nash conditions are satisfied in expectation (2.1). Moreover, let y be a minimum-cost strategy profile. Then
Proof. We first bound the expected cost of each player i ∈ [n] in the equilibrium P . By the Nash conditions, player i cannot improve by switching to the pure strategy y i . That is, where the last inequality is due to the fact that the cost functions considered in this paper are non-decreasing. By exploiting the linearity of expectation twice, we can now bound the expected social cost by
e · e (x e + 1) = E x∼P e∈E y e · e (x e + 1) .
Choosing (λ, µ) ∈ R × (0, 1) as the minimizer in Theorem 4.1 gives the bound
Lower Bound
We proceed by providing a matching lower bound, which holds even for network congestion games. We first give a general construction of a (non-network) instance (Theorem 4.3) and then present a network congestion game that is based on this construction (Theorem 4.4).
There is an unweighted congestion game that has a pure Nash equilibrium x and some other strategy profile y such that
Proof. Let k := Φ d . We construct an unweighted congestion game with n ≥ k + 2 players and |E| = 2 · n resources.
We partition the set E into two subsets E 1 := {g 1 , . . . , g n } and E 2 := {h 1 , . . . , h n }. Each player i ∈ [n] has two strategies in his strategy set S i := {x i , y i }, where
Here we denoted g j := g j−n and h j := h j−n for 2n ≥ j > n.
All resources e ∈ E 1 have the cost function e (z) := a · z d for an a ∈ R >0 yet to be determined, whereas all resources e ∈ E 2 incur cost e (z) := z d . In the following, we choose a such that the strategy profile x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) becomes a pure Nash equilibrium. The Nash conditions, i.e.,
Solving for a gives
where the second inequality is due to the irrationality of Φ d (Theorem 5.3), which implies k < Φ d . We now compare to the strategy profile y := (y 1 , . . . , y n ). The costs of any player i ∈ [n] are c i (x) = a · k d+1 + (k + 1) d+1 and c i (y) = a + 1. Hence,
Choosing a to fulfill the left-hand side of (4.1) with equality gives the desired result.
Theorem 4.4. The previous Theorem 4.3 also holds for network congestion games.
Proof. Instances of the congestion games in Theorem 4.3 can be characterized by two parameters:
The maximum degree d of the cost functions and the number of players n ≥ k+2 where k := Φ d . The number of resources is then 2n. .1 (left) shows an example of the network congestion game for quadratic resource cost functions (i.e., d = 2) and for n = 4 players. Unlabeled edges e ∈ E have e (x) = 0 as their cost function. As in the proof of Theorem 3.4, we say that these edges are free. All other edges have the associated cost function as in Theorem 4.2.
The network corresponding to an instance characterized by (d, n) can be constructed as follows: There is a circle of 2n undirected edges g 1 , h 1 , g 2 , h 2 , . . . , g n , h n . Each undirected edge (v 1 , v 2 ) has to be replaced by the construction shown in Figure 4 .1 (right). This ensures that no matter in which direction a player uses edge (v 1 , v 2 ) it produces load on the directed edge (v 3 , v 4 ). Now, every player i has its own origin node outside the circle-which is indicated by a gray background in the example. This origin node is connected with a free edge to the node incident to g i and h i−1 . The destination node of each player i is the node incident to g i+1 and h i , represented by a thick outline in the figure. To also allow each player i to choose strategy x i (which essentially goes the other way round inside the circle), we finally add one more free edge from i's origin node to the connecting node of g i+k+1 and h i+k+1 .
Note that our construction creates additional strategies for each player (relative to the abstract congestion game). Only two of these additional strategies for each player are a simple path: They correspond to {h i−1 } ∪ x i and {h i−1 } ∪ y i (roughly speaking, taking the "wrong" free edge from the origin node and then making a "sharp turn"). Clearly, these are dominated strategies, and they can be ignored.
Comparison to Weighted Games
A simple calculation show that the worst-case PoA for unweighted games is not "too far" away from the one for weighted games. Precisely, the worst-case PoA for unweighted games is bounded from below by Φ d d+1 and by Φ 
Analytical Tools
In this section, we prove the irrationality of Φ d , establish the asymptotic behavior of Φ d , and give the proofs of Theorems 3.1 and 4.1. These results are based on several technical lemmas that we state and prove in advance.
Preliminaries
Proof. Let d, r ∈ R ≥0 with d > r and g(r) ≥ 0. Since for x = 0 we have g(d) = g(r) = 1, we only consider the case x > 0 in the following. We get
By way of contradiction, assume g(d) ≤ g(r) and let ξ ∈ (r, d) be minimal with g (ξ) = 0. Such a ξ must exist due to the intermediate and mean value theorems. By definition of ξ, however, we have g(ξ) > g(r) = 0. Hence, g (ξ) > 0. A contradiction.
holds that g has exactly one local maximum, at some ξ ∈ R >0 . Moreover, g is strictly increasing in [0, ξ), and strictly decreasing in (ξ, ∞).
Proof. We have as necessary first-order condition for a local extremum that
is continuously differentiable, and for all x ∈ R >0 it holds that ∂ ∂x
As a result, there is a unique ξ ∈ R >0 with
. Since lim x→∞ g(x) = −∞, it follows that g has both a local and a global maximum at ξ and that g is strictly increasing in [0, ξ) and strictly decreasing in (ξ, ∞).
Properties of
Proof. Let d ∈ N. From Lemmata 5.1 and 5.2 it follows that Φ d is well-defined and Φ d > 1. By way of contradiction, suppose that Φ d is rational, i.e., there are coprime a, b ∈ N with
Hence,
Since a and b are coprime, so are a d and b. Moreover, a b is in reduced form, and thus b is a divisor of a d . Consequently, it must hold that a = b = 1. This is a contradiction to Φ d > 1.
Proof. We show that there is some d 0 so that for all d ≥ d 0 it holds that 
Taking the d-th root, multiplying with ln d c·d , and raising to the d-th power again yields the equivalent statement
Now recall that the tailor series expansion of f (x) := (1 + x) n about 0 is
where f (i) denotes the i-th derivative of f . Hence,
Consequently, when c = 2, 
where
(See [12] , for instance.) Hence, when d is sufficiently large 6 then
This proves the lower bound
Weighted Games: Proof of Theorem 3.1
As a first step of determining the exact value of Theorem 3.1, we simplify the expression to get rid of quantification over all polynomials.
Lemma 5.5. Let d ∈ N. Then,
Proof. We first note that for any µ ∈ (0, 1) the maximum on the right-hand side exists (Lemma 5.2). Assume there is a pair (λ, µ) ∈ R × (0, 1) with
Since each ∈ P d is a linear combination of monomials, (5.2) may be simplified such that ranges only over all monomials of maximum degree d. Moreover, when y = 0 the condition is fulfilled trivially. Therefore, (5.2) is equivalent to
Dividing by y r+1 and rearranging yields the equivalent condition
By substituting for x y , this can be further simplified to the equivalent condition
When x = 0, we have for all r ∈ [d] 0 that (x+1) r −µ·x r+1 = 1 > 0. Therefore, using Lemma 5.1, we can again simplify (5.4) to
Hence, we have that
Now, a straightforward way of evaluating the right-hand side of Lemma 5.5 would be to determine the value of the max-term with respect to any arbitrary µ ∈ (0, 1). According to Lemma 5.2, the maximum is even unique. Hence, there is temptation to treat the max-term as a function of µ and then use ordinary calculus for computing the infimum I. Unfortunately, this naive approach turns out to be infeasible as evaluating the max-term using first-order conditions requires solving for the roots of x → (x + 1) d − µ · x d+1 , i.e., a polynomial of degree d − 1. Our proof is therefore based on the following observation, which exploits the first-order condition (5.1) of Lemma 5.2: For each x ∈ R ≥0 , the condition yields a unique µ ∈ (0, 1) so that x becomes a maximizer (on R ≥0 ) of the aforementioned polynomial. Consequently, inserting into the right-hand side of Lemma 5.5 immediately gives an upper bound on the infimum I. In the following, we show that choosing x = Φ d (and µ accordingly) makes the upper bound and I coincide. 
Note that g is differentiable. The upper bound I ≤ Φ d+1 d
follows from the following two claims.
Proof of claim (i):
ii) Suppose there is a pair ( µ, x) ∈ (0, 1)×R >0 with µ = h( x). Then g( µ, x) = max x∈R ≥0 {g( µ, x)}.
Proof of claim (ii):
Clearly, x fulfills the necessary first order condition (5.1) for local extrema of g( µ, ·). By Lemma 5.2, we get that x is in fact the unique positive local maximum and that g( µ, ·) is strictly increasing in (0, x) and strictly decreasing in ( x, ∞). Clearly, this implies g( µ, x) = max x∈R ≥0 {g( µ, x)}.
Up to this point, we have shown that
holds, note that by definition of g, we have for all µ ∈ (0, 1) that
Finally, we remark that the infima in the previous lemmas are also minima: From the proof of Lemma 5.5, we know that for any fixed µ there is an "optimal" λ = max x∈R ≥0 {(x+1) d −µ·x d+1 }, see (5.5) . From the proof of Lemma 5.6 we get that there is an "optimal" µ ∈ (0, 1), see (5.6).
Unweighted Games: Proof of Theorem 4.1
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1. However, special care is necessary to account for the discrete variables. We start with a technical lemma that will allow us to make a simplification corresponding to the one from (5.3) to (5.4) in Lemma 5.5.
Lemma 5.7. Let d ∈ N 0 . Then it holds for all µ ∈ (0, 1) that
Proof. We first note that the maximum on the right-hand side exists (Lemma 5.2).
We will show that for all x ∈ N 0 , y ∈ N, there exists some x ∈ N 0 such that for all µ ∈ [0, 1]:
Fix now x ∈ N 0 and y ∈ N. If y ≥ x + 1 then we can choose x := 0 to see that for all µ ∈ [0, 1] we have g(0, 1, µ) = 1 ≥ g(x, y, µ). In the following we therefore assume w.l.o.g. that y ≤ x. Define x as the smallest integer such that g( x, 1, 0) ≥ g(x, y, 0), that is,
Since x ≥ y, we can write x = b 1 · y + b 2 for some b 1 ∈ N and b 2 ∈ [y − 1] 0 . This shows that
Since g( x, 1, ·) is an affine function, this completes the proof.
The proof is essentially a carbon copy of the proof for Lemma 5.5. Corresponding to equation (5.3), we have that I is the infimum of
We can now apply Lemma 5.7 by which (5.7) is equivalent to
Applying the same reasoning as for Lemma 5.5 completes the proof.
Recall from the previous remarks for the proof of Theorem 3.1 that for each x ∈ N 0 , there is some µ ∈ (0, 1) so that x becomes a maximizer (on N 0 ) of the polynomial
Consequently, inserting any such pair into the right-hand side of Lemma 5.8 immediately gives an upper bound on the infimum I. In the following, we show how to choose such a pair optimally. Note that g is differentiable on (0, 1) × R. The proof proceeds similar to Lemma 5.6. The upper bound on I follows from the following two claims.
i) There is a µ ∈ (0, 1) with g( µ, k) = g( µ, k + 1)
Proof of claim (i): Solving the equality g( µ, k) = g( µ, k + 1) for µ gives
Since both numerator and denominator of this fraction are positive, and since (k + 2) d < (k + 1) d+1 and (k + 1) d > k d+1 , we get that µ ∈ (0, 1).
ii) Suppose there is a pair ( µ, x) ∈ (0, 1) × N 0 with g( µ, x) = g( µ, x + 1). Then g( µ, x) = max x∈N 0 {g( µ, x)}.
Proof of claim (ii):
From the mean value theorem, we know that there is a ξ ∈ ( x, x + 1) with ∂ ∂x g( µ, x)| x=ξ = 0. By Lemma 5.2, we get that g( µ, ·) has its only positive local maximum at ξ and that g( µ, ·) is strictly increasing in [0, ξ) and strictly decreasing in (ξ, ∞). Clearly, this implies g( µ, x) = g( µ, x + 1) = max x∈N 0 {g( µ, x)}. Now fix µ as in claim (i). Up to this point, we have shown that
To show that I is also lower-bounded by the right-hand-side expression, we show as last claim:
iii) It holds for all µ ∈ (0, µ) that g(µ, k + 1) > g( µ, k) and for all µ ∈ ( µ, 1) that g(µ, k) > g( µ, k).
Proof of claim (iii):
For all x ∈ N 0 it holds that g(·, x) is monotonic as can be seen by looking at the partial derivatives:
This immediately implies I ≥ g( µ, k). Finally, we remark that the infima in the previous lemmas are also minima: From the proof of Lemma 5.8, we know that for any fixed µ there is an "optimal" λ = max x∈N 0 {(x + 1) d − µ · x d+1 }. From the proof of Lemma 5.9 we get that there is an "optimal" µ ∈ (0, 1), see (5.9).
Conclusion
In this work, we gave exact values for the worst-case PoA in atomic unsplittable congestion games, provided that all resource cost functions are bounded-degree polynomials with nonnegative coefficients. It had been known before that the asymptotic growth of the PoA is exponential in the degree of the polynomials. Yet, it came as a surprise that this manifests already in rather simple networks with only quadratic or cubic resource cost functions, where the PoA can be as large as 9 or 40, respectively.
Qualitatively, we learned several things that could not be deduced from previous works: The difference between the unweighted and weighted cases is small (though non-zero); there is no difference at all between the worst-case PoA of network and abstract congestion games; and we gave a structure for worst-case examples that-as we now know from hindsight-could be modified and generalized to a worst-case example for arbitrary cost functions [37] .
As an interesting direction for further research, it remains an open problem to rigorously characterize what structures provide immunity against a high PoA and what structures cause it. While, for instance, it is known that symmetric unweighted network congestion games on so-called extension-parallel graphs always enjoy a PoA as low as in non-atomic games [13] , the worst-case PoA is unknown even for series-parallel graphs. Quite remarkably, for weighted games, the worst-case PoA is known and no difference exists between parallel links and arbitrary complex structures [5] .
